

THE COST OF NO EU-TURKEY III: FIVE VIEWS

The Long Story of Turkey and the EU

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Ayşe Kadioğlu



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Introduction

Gökçe Tüylüođlu

Executive Director, Open Society Foundation

Gülgün Küçükören

Program Coordinator, Open Society Foundation

We, as the Open Society Foundation, continue to believe that as Turkey and the EU gets closer to each other open society values grow stronger and align our efforts accordingly.

In 2009, we started an annual, intellectual exercise by asking people whom we respect for their analytical insights and intellectual candor to articulate their perspectives on what the costs of a sub-optimal EU-Turkey relation would be. Carl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden; Norbert Walter, Chief Economist of Deutsche Bank; Paulina Lampsa, International Relations Secretary of PASOK; and Hakan Yilmaz, Professor of Political Science at Bogazici University have shared their balance sheet on this issue with us. Howard Dean, the Chairman Emeritus of the Democratic National Committee and one of the most interesting voices of the American Democrats, who has opposed the war from Iraq from the outset and Sevket Pamuk, Chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies in European Institute of London School of Economics and Political Science have joined us in our exercise in 2010.

This year, we have five different contributors and three of them are from current and next EU presidencies. Prof. Peter Balazs, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary and former EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, underlines that not only Turkey needs Europe for her further modernization and welfare but Europe needs Turkey as well for her stability and security. We have a gripping article from Poland, which dwells on historical arguments and points out the indispensable place of Turkey in Europe's foreign policy imagination. For this article, we are grateful to the President of Unia&Polska Foundation, Krzysztof Bobinski. Cyprus is represented by Philippos Savvides of International Center for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies, who attracts attention to the potential role of a united Cyprus in acceleration of Turkey's EU membership process as well as in the construction of security and stability in the Middle East and North Africa. We heartened by Bobinski and other friends who have throughout the years not tired of speaking the truth on all issues of global open society. EU-Turkey relations is only one of the many issues in that precious constellations.

Last year we started inviting our friends from outside of EU-Turkey nexus. Howard Dean provided us first thought provoking assessment. This year, we are pleased to have two contributors from Azerbaijan, Shahin Abbasov and Farid Gahramanov, who sincerely presents Azerbaijan's public opinion on Turkey's EU accession process. They also underline the possible political and economic gains of Azerbaijan and the wider region in case of Turkey's EU membership.

Lastly, we are pleased to have Prof. Ayse Kadioglu of Sabanci University who is also a member of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe. By reviving the term of "*convivencia*", she analyzes historical and current parameters of coexistence in Europe and Turkey's potential role in igniting the fire of dynamic Europe, which will embrace the spirit of *convivencia* once again with Turkey's accession.

On another May 9, the day when Robert Schuman presented his vision for the European Union in 1950 , we are pleased to be continuing to share with you the analytical insights of the ones who believe in Europe and take the time to review how far this unique and daring project of peace, prosperity and liberty has come, and what more needs to be done. Although there is a common perception that former enthusiasm replaced by a reluctance both in Turkey and the EU sides, we will insist on drawing attention to the costs of sub-optimal EU-Turkey relations.

We are grateful to Hakan Altınay, the former Executive Director and current advisor of the Open Society Foundation, for leading this exercise.

The Long Story of Turkey and the EU Problems and Perspectives

Péter BALÁZS

***Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungary (2009-2010)
EU Commissioner (2004)***

No European state has been waiting for as long for EU accession as Turkey. It is a common observation that the door for potential EU membership was opened almost half a century ago, with the 1963 Ankara Agreement. There is no doubt about the continued validity of the European perspective and of Turkey's eligibility for membership. However, it took until 1987 for the next generation of Turkish politicians to reach a decision to apply for EU membership. Another 18 years passed before the third generation could finally take its place at the negotiating table in the autumn of 2005. Will it be the next, a fourth generation that will sign the EU Accession Treaty for Turkey sometime in the coming decade?

Will it be the next, a fourth generation of Turks that will sign the EU Accession Treaty for Turkey sometime in the coming decade?

We are speaking about subsequent generations of politicians, but behind them new generations of Turkish people have been growing up. The first two generations – those of the Ankara Agreement and the application for EU membership – shared the enthusiasm of the political class and supported the rapprochement of Turkey to the integrated centre of Europe. However, the third generation has shown signs of disillusion and gives less credit to the European perspective of Turkey. Instead of further expanding the modernization of Kemal Atatürk, tradition has gained momentum. How would the fourth generation receive and sustain stronger links with the highly developed centre of Europe if the EU finally takes Turkey on board?

TAKING A FRESH LOOK FROM BOTH SIDES

During five decades of EU-Turkish relations, the two parties have changed, including the people and the political 'elites' guiding and governing them. Today new partners are facing each other, a new generation on both the Turkish and the EU side. They should make a mutual review of their relations in light of recent developments. What are the most significant new elements?

First of all, the EU has grown to a 27 member organisation, with the real possibility of 30 member states in the future. Enlargement has proven to be a dynamic process, and candidates are still queuing up before the half-open door of the Union. With the last 'big' enlargement (2004-2007) the acceptance of Turkey in the EU has gained more support. 'New' member states such as Poland, Hungary and others, are mostly in favour of Turkish accession. However, the sympathy of the new internal periphery does not counterbalance the reluctance of central EU powers like France or Germany.

In parallel, the forced EU accession of Cyprus in its actual, unfinished status has charged the EU-Turkish relations with additional problems, further complicating the sensitive negotiation dossiers. Achieving the unification of Cyprus based on the UN parameters and an agreement between the two communities of the island, and with the strong external support of Greece and Turkey, could quickly solve some of the contentious questions of the Turkish-EU accession negotiations (i.e. energy and foreign, security and defence policy).

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After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU has strengthened its presence in the Black Sea region. With Turkey as a future member on the EU side, strategic issues of energy, transport, environment and others could find a better and more durable solution in the whole Black Sea region. Adding Croatia and (with an obvious time difference) Serbia as potential future EU members, the building of the Nabucco project would become more realistic, as well as other pipelines connecting core EU regions with Central Asian energy sources through Turkish territories.

The 2003 Thessaloniki perspective steers the course of EU enlargement firmly towards the Western Balkan region. The Western Balkans constitutes the geographical ‘missing link’ between core Europe and Turkey. The rapprochement of this picturesque area to the EU will construct a new and solid continental connection with Turkey across various – economic, infrastructural, cultural – issues. One hindrance is that some of the successors of ex-Yugoslavia have not entirely finalized their state-building efforts: internal unification is still underway (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), the international recognition of the name of the state (Macedonia) or of its mere existence (Kosovo) are all pending. In addition, a region consisting of seven states with 25 million inhabitants may inspire the EU to follow a parallel enlargement strategy based on the traditional country by country approach and a regional level of conditionality. This complex approach may need some more time to develop.

EU ENLARGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS

The realistic contenders for EU enlargement (aside from Iceland) for the foreseeable future are Turkey and the Western Balkan countries. The rest of the eligible ‘European neighbours’ – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – are framed by the Eastern Partnership project of the Union. Their relations with the EU are rather ambiguous in view of the strong attraction and influence of their ‘eastern partner’, Russia. Political transition is still in course in those countries and western type democracies have not yet been consolidated. The ‘Eastern Partners’ of the EU should also solve the very complex enigmas of the ‘frozen conflicts’ – the problems of disputed and, from the viewpoint of the international community, uncontrolled territories. In the coming decades the east European neighbours could be attached to the EU through the deepening relations of the Eastern Partnership project. In the western part of the continent, the EFTA partners – Norway and Switzerland – already benefit from multiple relations to the EU including membership of the Schengen area.

In view of the above, for the time being the challenge of EU enlargement can be reduced to Turkey and the Western Balkans. The usual questions raised by EU governments and public opinion in the given enlargement context are centred on four main issues: the immigration potential, cultural diversity, voting weights and budgetary consequences. Apart from this, the obvious advantages of extending the Single Market and the Trans-European Networks of transport, energy and telecommunication or applying the EU environment protection rules on a larger area and many similar benefits of EU enlargement are not contested, but

neither are they emphasised. Let us take a fresh look at the four most controversial questions.

It is evident that after the accession of new member states the expected workforce 'invasion' (from Spain, Poland etc.) did not take place, in spite of some notable differences in wage levels.

The immigration potential of the two prospective areas, the Western Balkans and Turkey, are very different. The seven states of the Western Balkan region with a total population of about 25 million people represent a manageable size. At the same time, Turkey alone possesses a rapidly growing population close to 74 million and leaning closer to 80 million. Forecasts predict a gradual decrease of the growth rate, but the impact of Turkish EU accession on the very sensitive EU labour market should not be left for spontaneous mechanisms. Solutions must be thoroughly negotiated during EU accession talks, and appropriate transition measures which 2004 negotiations framework already provides for. In this respect, core EU countries could learn one important lesson from past enlargements. It is evident that after the accession of new member states the expected workforce 'invasion' (from Spain, Poland etc.) did not take place, in spite of some notable differences in wage levels. On the contrary, a general easing of the pressure on the central segments of the EU labour market (Germany, Austria, Holland, Sweden etc.) could be stated as the increasing freedom of labour movement is taming the wish of 'going West' from peripheral member states.

Concerning cultural diversity, a more colourful picture characterises not only Turkey, but several Balkan countries as well. Islamic culture has deep roots in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, as well as in EU member Bulgaria. In all these countries, including Turkey, a modernized, European form of Islam is the rule. The common aim of these countries and of the EU should be preserving this culture as a valuable heritage of Europe and keeping away the influence of fundamentalism and terrorism misusing Islam. Well-targeted EU projects could help towards this objective.

The voting weights of the Western Balkans and Turkey in the EU Council would expose a dual problem: the number of states and the number of citizens will have to be taken into account and could cause serious tensions. Paradoxically, these are the two main, equally important, sources of legitimacy of the Union. With the hypothetical accession of all the Western Balkan states after Croatia, six more seats should be added at all levels of the Council, from expert groups through the Coreper up to

the European Council. Similar institutional consequences of the 'big enlargement' of 2004-2007, when the number of seats increased by twelve, have yet to be digested. A further increase of the number of Member State actors would paralyze the everyday functioning of the EU. In the Turkish case, one single new Member State would have an enormous voting weight, at the same level as Germany. But Germany is one of the founding members, holds a central location in Europe surrounded by nine European continental neighbours and is the main contributor to the EU budget. Consequently, before the accession of Turkey and all the Western Balkan states, institutional aspects of the Council should be seriously revised and the forms of direct member states' representation reconsidered.

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The budgetary consequences of future EU enlargements will also shed more light on growing differences in the economic development level on the peripheries of Europe. The newest EU members – Romania and Bulgaria – have started from a level of about one third of the EU average. Other Balkan countries and Turkey are also at that development level. Consequently, they would all widen the camp of net recipients of the EU budget whereas the central circle of net contributors (led by Germany) is unchanged. In this very sensitive context, the objectives and the sources of EU financing should also be re-thought before any major new enlargement. The first steps in this direction could be taken in parallel with the preparations of the 2014-2020 Financial Perspective.

In a more general approach, the next enlargement wave embracing Turkey and the Western Balkans is not a mere routine exercise of negotiating the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in the candidate countries chapter by chapter but would need a more thorough preparation inside the EU. After the hopeful accession of Croatia and Iceland in the foreseeable future, some reflection time and preparation for further enlargements, including the accession of Turkey, should follow.

EUROPE NEEDS TURKEY

As a reaction to the lengthy and reluctant behaviour of the EU, Turkey has started in the recent years to shape a new foreign policy position in the world. Instead of sitting in the waiting room of the EU without a clear European perspective, she is putting Ankara in the centre of her own region using traditional economic, strategic, cultural and historical ties with a large neighbourhood in the Middle East and beyond. The emerging role of the informal G-20 meetings is lending even more weight to the new initiatives of Turkey which is a natural member of the club of the biggest economies of the World.

Turkey could play an extremely important role as a model and potential mediator. This would be a proof, once again, that not only Turkey needs Europe for her further modernization and welfare, but Europe needs Turkey as well for her stability and security.

The most recent events across the Arab region, reacting to the serious consequences of the economic crisis and overthrowing old and petrified political regimes, creates new sources of concern for the EU as well. Consolidation and stabilisation of the situation and the exclusion of any dangerous fundamentalist influence is a high priority on the European agenda. Turkey could play an extremely important role in this context as a model and potential mediator. This would be a proof, once again, that not only Turkey needs Europe for her further modernization and welfare, but Europe needs Turkey as well for her stability and security.

Turkey Must Enrich the European Union's Political Imagination

Krzysztof Bobiński

***President of Unia & Polska Foundation, Warsaw
Former Journalist, Financial Times***

The current turmoil in the Arab world reflects a mixture of political and social demands interlaced with a simple yearning for human dignity. It has left the European Union facing one of its biggest post cold war challenges. It also shows that the EU is at a loss for an adequate response. The EU's neighbourhood policy, with its pro democracy rhetoric, self interest and lassitude, has been shown to be woefully weak when faced with an overwhelming demand for change in North Africa and the Middle East. The struggle for reforms also bring Turkey's role as a key player in the region into sharp relief. If anything, Ankara's drive to join the EU, currently in the doldrums, has to be given a new urgency. The European Union needs to bring Turkey's political experience and historical imagination into its policy shaping process as a candidate firmly on the way to membership. Only then, will Brussels and the member state capitals be better equipped to react to what has happened in the Mediterranean basin and beyond with vision and in a mature way.

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Clearly the European Union's southern neighbourhood, like the eastern neighbourhood, is here to stay. No longer are officials in Brussels and politicians in member states able to let relations with the southern neighbourhood slip down their policy agendas as they provide aid to local dictators and rely on them to keep their people in order. Nor are they able to look to the United States to make sure the oil continues to flow and Israel remains secure. Brussels has to sit up and take notice if only because the uprising threatens to unleash a wave of migrants onto the European mainland. In a word, Brussels has to reach out to the neighbourhood before the neighbourhood arrives on Brussels' doorstep.

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The European Union has come through a number of phases since its inception in the 1950s as a cold war institution designed to provide cohesion on the European continent in the face of the Soviet threat. United States' support for European integration at that time also ran to the inclusion of Turkey, an important NATO ally. In any event, Turkey applied to join in 1959, a mere year after the European Economic Community, the EU's forerunner, was established. Europe has never said no in the ensuing 52 years. Neither has it said a final yes.

The end of the cold war complicated matters. The clear pre 1989 divisions which had sharply defined the frontiers of the EU's possible enlargements disappeared. Membership for the former Soviet states became inevitable as a clear signal that Europe was once more to be united. But Ankara stayed on the sidelines, no longer a key NATO frontline state. Nevertheless, its cause advanced after the country re- applied for membership in 1997 and embarked on serious reforms in the first half of the present decade. The drive has now petered out. This is partly due to enlargement fatigue in Western Europe as the Union digests the latest enlargement to the former communist states. But there is also the rise of the cultural argument that Turkey, a Muslim country, would be an alien implant in what is essentially a Christian community. At the same time, the EU needs a new narrative to legitimise its continuing existence in the 21st century. In the search for that narrative it might be helpful to look back to before 1914 when Europe, though divided among nation states and empires, was united culturally and ideologically. It was also then that Turkey, without doubt, was considered to be a member of the European community.

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It should not be surprising that this argument should come from Poland which will be celebrating the 600th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire in 2012. Poland, which is to hold the presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2011, enjoyed long periods of peace and mutual trade with the Ottomans. Poland's steadfast support for Turkish membership of the EU also reflects her gratitude for the refusal of the Ottomans to recognize the country's partition in the 19th century.

The historical argument is worth dwelling on. The Cold War in Europe marked a break with traditional developments in Europe and its neighbouring regions. For example, the Iron Curtain blocked the traditional flow of labour from Poland into Germany in the 19th century until 1939. If it hadn't been for that then the Germany would not have had to have reached for Turkish immigrants to work on its economic recovery. It would have had Poles instead.

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As memories of the Cold War divide recedes, so longer lasting trends re-emerge. As Professor Hakan Yilmaz from Bogazici University in Istanbul recently remarked at a conference in Warsaw, "the Cold War artificially froze Turkey, the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus which made up the former Ottoman world. And now the Cold War is over, the rivers have once again begun to flow along their historical paths reviving traditional patterns of trade, human relations and cultural exchange". "There has been an immense intensification of trade, tourism, educational and media linkages between Turkey and its neighbours to the east and west," he continued. "Where this new history is going to lead the peoples of the region is not at all certain. In that regard, the EU's commitment to the region, by way of making Turkey a member and linking other countries to itself through a meaningful eastern neighbourhood policy, will certainly help the countries there to choose the path of democracy" he concluded.

This argues for Brussels to embrace Turkey and its neighbourhood in order to secure the region for democracy and economic development. But as the events in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere have shown Europe also urgently needs Turkey to help cope with the policy challenge facing the EU of actively ensuring political and economic revival in these countries.

Each EU member state brings its historical imagination to foreign policy shaping in the EU. Holland and Portugal remember world trading and colonial roles. Spain has Latin America. Britain and France retain an active interest in Africa and elsewhere. Poland finds this in the territories of its former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Eastern Europe. Turkey's historical imagination stems from the former Ottoman Empire. In Turkey's case, this imperial experience also runs together with the drive for modernization reforms beginning in the 1840s called the Tanzimat. Later, and most spectacularly, with Kemal Ataturk's drastic swing towards western ways in the 1920s to enable his country, Turkey, to survive and compete in a post Ottoman world.

Were the EU to continue to drag its feet on Turkey's accession negotiations then it would not only would it lose a country which the Arab world views as a successful example of a Muslim democracy. It would also forgo the opportunity to avail itself of Turkey's historical imagination and the sensitivities to the Middle East and North Africa which that brings. These are sensitivities which Paris, London or Berlin and Brussels lack.

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It is time to drop the line that Turkey is, somehow, alien to 'christian' Europe. We have been in close touch with each other for hundreds of years. The Polish language uses hundreds of words taken directly from Turkish. Paris, counter to the anti-Ottoman urging of the Christian Pope in Rome, was ever seeking to check Hapsburg ambitions by cooperating with Istanbul. Before the First World War, Germany felt no 'cultural' compunction against encouraging Muslim nationalism against the British in the Middle East. Britain and France went to war against Russia with Turkey on their side in 1853.

Two 19th century capitals remain outside the EU - St Petersburg and Istanbul. The events in the Muslim world have shown that the missing piece containing Istanbul has to be slotted into its place on the jigsaw puzzle.

The Treaty of Paris in 1856, which ended the Crimean War, recognised the Ottoman Empire as 'a member of equal standing of the concert of Europe'. Successive enlargements have brought the key 19th century European capitals into the European Union and enriched its political imagination. The last 15 years have seen the accession of Vienna, with its special interest in the Danube and the Balkans and the Scandinavian capitals of Sweden and Finland with their 'northern' dimension. And Warsaw, while not a 19th century national capital, never forgot the amputation of its eastern territories in the 18th century. Poland retains a key interest in its former commonwealth. Two 19th century capitals remain outside the EU - St Petersburg and Istanbul. Whether and when St Petersburg will rejoin the 'concert of Europe' is an open question. But the events in the Muslim world have shown that the missing piece

containing Istanbul has to be slotted into its place on the jigsaw puzzle. Counter to its historic traditions the EU might continue to try and continue to look inward... But the drive for change in the Middle East and North Africa will force it to take its southern neighbourhood seriously. And the EU will find that without Turkey it will not be able to cope.

Resolving the Cyprus Problem and Reenergizing Turkey's EU Accession Process

Philippos Savvides

International Center for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies, Athens

The European Union has gone through important phases of transformation. Unlike the stagnation we see today, during the 1980s, the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century, Europe pursued an active policy with two main pillars: (1) deepening and (2) widening. Deepening meant institutional reforms that could lead to further integration; not only economic integration, but political as well. Widening meant enlargement; bringing into the Union the countries of eastern and south eastern Europe, as well as those in the eastern Mediterranean.

The policy of deepening and widening had a clear task: create the conditions so that Europe will never return to its ugly past. This is a past characterized by bloody conflicts and two world wars. As Ole Waever correctly pointed out, the “other” for Europe is its history, which is full of wars and catastrophes. The greatest threat for Europe is a return to this past.¹ Hence, the primary goal for Europeans, especially progressive Europeans, was the acceleration of the processes of integration and enlargement in order to escape fragmentation and conflict.

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Within this framework the Union initiated the accession process for Cyprus and Turkey, and welcomed Greece's bold decision in 1999 to lift its veto and allow Turkey to proceed with its European aspirations. It became clear, under the 1999 Helsinki EU Council decision, and subsequent EU decisions, that Turkey, in order to become a full member, would have to fulfill all its obligations, implement extensive domestic

¹ Ole Waever, “The EU as a Security Actor” in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 279.

reforms, normalize relations with its neighbors and contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

In the long term, this policy could lead to the emergence of a triangle of peace and stability comprised of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. In turn, this development could contribute to Europe's task: to avoid a return to its fragmented and conflictual past.²

The establishment of a stable triangle among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey becomes crucial for the stability and security of the region as a whole. To this end, the resolution of the Cyprus problem, as well as the continuation and acceleration of Turkey's accession process, are critical factors.

The ongoing developments in the Middle East and North Africa make the observations above more relevant than ever. No one is, at this point, in a position to accurately predict the final outcome of the events unfolding in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. What is certain is that there will be a transitional period characterized by high levels of fragility, uncertainty and unpredictability. Hence, the establishment of a stable triangle among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey becomes crucial for the stability and security of the region as a whole. To this end, the resolution of the Cyprus problem, as well as the continuation and acceleration of Turkey's accession process, are critical factors.

CYPRUS IN THE EU

Initially, a number of political actors, analysts and journalists expressed their skepticism, even their opposition, to Cyprus' accession into the Union. Their main argument was that a country in conflict cannot be a member of a supranational organization such as the EU. Moreover, they argued that Cyprus' accession would have negative repercussions on efforts for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

It is true that the accession process of Cyprus did not lead to a solution of the Cyprus problem by May 2004. It is also true that the failure to solve the problem and subsequent developments created grave disappointment within the Turkish Cypriot community of the island. However, one should not ignore the fact that Europe and

² For more on the idea and the importance of the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey "triangle" see: Paulina Lampsa, "A Stable Eastern Mediterranean", *The Cost of No EU-Turkey: Four Views*, Open Society Foundation (May 2009), pp. 12-15.

its principles and norms can still provide the impetus and foundation upon which to build a common European future for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. Outside Europe, it would be almost impossible for the two communities to build their common future. Indeed, the accession of Cyprus into the EU undermines any effort to return to the traditional policies of the past. Namely, the policy of domination by the Greek Cypriots as well as the policy of partition by the Turkish Cypriots.

This new vision for Cyprus can be constructed within what Jurgen Habermas calls “a nation of citizens”.³ That is, a state where the citizen is the center of all political, social and economic activity. In other words, the citizen becomes the protagonist of the political world. In such a state, substantive democracy can develop whereby the citizen participates freely regardless of his or her religion, ethnic origin, language and culture. This process can then lead to the cultivation of “citizenhood”; that is, the construction of a citizen identity where loyalty to the “democratic constitutional state” becomes paramount. In today’s multicultural Europe, the cultivation of citizens, and not of nationals, must be a priority.⁴

A federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal Cyprus, as a member of the EU, could become a real case of Habermas’ “nation of citizens”. This is a vision that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike can share and work together to make a reality within Europe.

A “nation of citizens” has two main pillars: (1) devolution, decentralization and enhancement of local communities, and (2) an open and free public space. The citizens become part of the process of writing the rules of the democratic game, and the state is not a Leviathan but a “servant” to the needs of the citizen. At the same time, nationalism subsides and a new type of “democratic constitutional patriotism” emerges; that is, a new “patriotism” that allows the citizens to believe in the legitimacy of the procedures in enacting laws and exercising power. It is a “patriotism” under which the individual is able to enjoy his or her multiple identities without discrimination and with political equality. Within this framework a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal Cyprus, as a member of the EU, could become a real case of a “nation of citizens”. This is a vision that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike can share and work together to make a reality within Europe.

3 Jurgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (eds.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998).

4 For more on the concept of “citizenhood” see: Theodore Coulombis and Philippos Savvides (eds.) *Building Citizenhood in a Democratic Cyprus* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2004).

THE ROLE OF A UNITED CYPRUS

In Europe, and in light of developments in the region, the resolution of the Cyprus issue has become more urgent. Cyprus, as a member of the Union, has a role to play for the stability in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. It is a role that will certainly be enhanced by a resolution of the political problem and by the inclusion of Turkey into the European architecture. Cyprus can be the locomotive for stability and cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean.

What are the advantages that Cyprus, a united Cyprus, brings to the table?

1. A united, multicultural Cyprus, member of the European Union, can serve as a good example for the region. It can become a “laboratory” for conflict resolution and peace-making.
2. Under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, Cyprus, due to its geographic location, has a unique role to play in, among other things, humanitarian and “rescue and relief” operations. Its airports, ports and highly developed infrastructure can be used for operations such as these by the Union and its partners.
3. A united Cyprus can be a place for enhanced economic activity in tourism and trade. Cyprus, Greece and Turkey can be an attractive “triangle” for tourists who will be able to travel with minimal restrictions and at a low cost.
4. Energy can become a source of regional cooperation and progress rather than conflict and division. The possible gas and oil reserves around Cyprus can become an incentive for wider collaboration that could produce larger benefits for the area, and especially for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. Put differently, after a solution, the two communities will be able to share the economic and other benefits on a national and regional level.

Even though the prospects for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem might look bleak, there is space for cautious optimism. The 2012 EU Presidency of Cyprus can be an incentive to accelerate the process for a solution.

Even though the prospects for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem might look bleak, there is space for cautious optimism. A comprehensive solution is possible only through a sincere and constructive dialogue based on the agreements between Christofias and Talat of May 23rd and July 1st, 2008. The 2012 EU Presidency of Cyprus

can be an incentive to accelerate the process for a solution. A solution to the problem will enhance and strengthen Cyprus' capacity to push forward its Presidency priorities.

The Cyprus Presidency provides a unique opportunity to bring to the forefront problems and challenges that eastern Mediterranean countries have to face. Migration, the consequences of climate change, energy policies and basic resource management (i.e. water) are issues that need to be given priority by the Cyprus Presidency. Moreover, these issues cannot be tackled effectively without regional cooperation. To this end, the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle becomes the focal point around which this regional cooperation can develop.

CONCLUSIONS

The resolution of the Cyprus problem will not only embolden the island's role, but will also help to revitalize Turkey's EU accession negotiations. On the other hand, the continuation of Turkey's EU accession process will help the negotiation process. Moreover, it will reassure the skeptics that Turkey will remain committed to the solution that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots agree upon.

The resolution of the Cyprus problem will certainly take away the “fig leaf” from those in Europe using the perpetuation of the Cyprus problem as a pretext to block Turkey's process towards EU membership.

A united Cyprus could become the most important advocate for Turkey's EU membership. It is therefore in Turkey's best interest to help resolve the Cyprus problem. At the same time, it is also in the best interest of the Republic of Cyprus to support Turkey's European aspirations provided that Turkey fulfills all of its obligations, including the implementation of the Additional Protocol. The resolution of the Cyprus problem will, after all, be a win-win outcome for all actors involved. It will certainly take away the “fig leaf” from those in Europe using the perpetuation of the Cyprus problem as a pretext to block Turkey's process towards EU membership.

One might argue that due to the bleak situation in Europe, and the fact that Turkey seems to be losing interest in its European prospects, this argument is naïve or even unrealistic. It is true that Europe is not today as attractive as it was in the beginning of this century. European citizens are very disappointed and disheartened by the way the current European leadership manages the affairs of the Union. Similarly, prospective EU member states, including Turkey, might feel betrayed. But are these reasons enough to abandon Europe?

The interests of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey are interconnected when it comes to Europe. All three actors can only benefit from a stronger and more integrated Europe. At the same time, it is in Europe's best interest to assist in developing a strong cooperation between these three states; this is even more so at this critical juncture for the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The interests of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey are interconnected when it comes to Europe. All three actors can only benefit from a stronger and more integrated Europe. At the same time, it is in Europe's best interest to assist in developing a strong cooperation between these three states; this is even more so at this critical juncture for the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. However, to achieve the goal of a stable and peaceful Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle there is a need to concentrate all of our efforts on making the resolution of the Cyprus problem a reality, and reenergizing Turkey's EU prospects.

Azerbaijan Supports Turkey's EU Integration

Shahin Abbasov and Farid Gahramanov

Modern Turkey is an important factor of international politics which affects the development of political processes in several regions of Eurasia – Balkans, Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea basin. Turkey became a role-model for Turkic-language former Soviet republics – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – in the process of building their new independent states in the 1990s. It was secular Turkey, and not clerical Islamic regimes, which became a model to follow for young post-Soviet countries. Turkey took a mission to be a source of inspiration, and oriented the new Turkic-language countries towards the Western democratic values and free market economy principles. Of course, all the young independent states have failed to introduce these standards fully, but they at least declared these principles as the vectors for development.

For Azerbaijan, more than for other countries, strategic relations with Turkey are of utmost importance while for the whole period since Azerbaijan's independence obtained in 1991, Ankara has been Baku's major foreign policy ally often securing the country's independence.

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It would be useful to recall the historical context. Turkey is the major and most natural strategic ally of Azerbaijan. In sense of Azerbaijanis, Turks are the only brotherly nation which is ready to support during tough times. It was Turkish army which liberated Baku from the “Central-Caspian Dictatorship” government in September 1918, and provided security of Azerbaijani population. Thanks to arrival of Turkish troops, the government of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (Musavat government, 1918-1920) was able to move from Ganja city to Baku.

Restoration of strategic friendship between Turkey and Azerbaijan became one of the most important political dominant in Azerbaijan's newest history. Ankara actively protested against the punitive operation of Soviet Army in Baku in January 1990. In November 1991 Turkey was the first country which recognized independence of Azerbaijan eventhough the Soviet Union had not officially collapsed then. Turkey provided serious support to Azerbaijan in the process of recognition the young country's independence by international community. During first years of independence when Azerbaijan Republic did not have diplomatic missions abroad, Turkey represented its interests.

Within recent years, Azerbaijan and Turkey implemented several large regional projects which increased their geo-political importance in international political and economic affairs. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and South-Caucasus gas pipeline (SCP) became an alternative delivery source for energy resources to Europe. Currently, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia are in the process of implementation of another regional project – Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad which could become an advantageous route between the East and West.

Late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev provided a clear and correct metaphore to describe the contemporary relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan – “One nation, two states.”

News from Turkey are widely covered in Azerbaijani media and often becoming a lead stories in local newspapers and TV. Meanwhile, Turkish movies and soap-operas are much more popular at Azerbaijani television than local shows and movies. Spontaneous mass celebration happened in Baku when Turkish national team got third place at the Football World Cup in 2002.

Turkey will be accepted into the EU only after full completion of democratic reforms. The example of such Turkey will be attractive to Azerbaijani public and could act as catalyst of democratic processes inside the country.

One of the major tasks of Turkey's foreign policy – accession to the European Union – finds active support by national elites and ordinary citizens of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan also has European aspirations and currently is the member of two EU initiatives – European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. Therefore the process of Turkey's EU integration and problems in this area are closely followed and discussed in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani public is unequivocally critical of the European Union reluctance concerning Turkey's accession to the Union. Many see this as discrimination on religious grounds, and as a result of the desire to keep the EU as a "Christian club."

Governing elite has a nuanced approach. Turkey will be accepted into the EU only after full completion of democratic reforms. The example of such Turkey will be attractive to Azerbaijani public and could act as catalyst of democratic processes inside the country. Azerbaijani government which practices a tough authoritarian rule in the country, is weary of a such prospect.

Member of Parliament Asim Mollazade, on the other hand, believes that Azerbaijan's Forefathers had created Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918-1920 on the basis of European democratic values. The first Republic was bright example of democratic state model in the Muslim and Turkic country, the MP argues. Later this model was successfully implemented by Ataturk in Turkey.

Another political expert, former foreign policy aid of Azerbaijani president, Vafa Guluzade, also believes that "the progress of Turkey and reinforcement of its international positions fully corresponds with Azerbaijan's national interests." "The stronger Turkey is, the more powerful and prosperous is Azerbaijan. I have absolutely no doubts about it," Guluzade said. He supports Turkey's foreign policy course on entering the EU. "It facilitates democratic development and reforms in Turkey. It also improves Turkey's image in the Western world regardless on how soon it will be accepted," Guluzade said.

Turkish accession to the European Union finds active support by national elites and ordinary citizens of Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries. Once Turkey enters the EU, these countries will have a trusted advocate of their interests in the European community with wide political, economic and financial resources.

Guluzade said that all Azerbaijani intellectual elite wishes Turkey's accession to the EU and its successful integration as soon as possible. The exception is only small part of people in the ruling elite of Azerbaijan. "These people do not want closer relations with Turkey and therefore Azerbaijan still applies visa regime with this country. They do not want spreading of democracy and European values from Turkey to Azerbaijan," he said.

At present Turkey remains in the vanguard of the Turkic world. Its successes in the world advances national interests of post-Soviet Turkic-language countries. Turkey's accession to the European Union finds active support by national elites and ordinary citizens of Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries. Once Turkey entered the EU, these countries will have a trusted advocate of their interests in the European community with wide political, economic and financial resources.

Needless to say that the EU's demands that Ankara normalizes its relations with Armenia are a source of discontent in Azerbaijan. This issue negatively affects perception of the West by the public in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani media portrays the issue as double standards of Western powers.

“How it is possible to demand and pressure Turkey to normalize relations with Armenia and not apply similar pressing to Yerevan for ongoing occupation of Azerbaijan's territories? How can European politicians assess events which happened 95 years ago and close their eyes to massacre of Azerbaijanis in 1992 in Hojaly?” asks Zahid Orudj, Member of Parliament from “Ana Veten” party.

With Turkey's accession to the EU, Azerbaijan's energy resources will be directly delivered to the EU market without any corridor.

In general, intellectual part of Azerbaijani public strongly believes that Turkey deserves and is ready to be EU member. “Turkey's accession into the European Union is in the interests of Azerbaijan,” Rasim Musabekov, seasoned Baku-based political analysts said. First, in face of Turkey, Azerbaijan will have the best ally in the EU, he believes. Second, Turkey is part of transport corridor which delivers Azerbaijan's energy resources to the EU market. “With Turkey's accession to the EU, Azerbaijan's energy resources will be directly delivered to the EU market without any corridor,” Musabekov said. Third, Azerbaijan's state-owned and private investments have already begun to flow into Turkish economy and their volume will only increase in the future. In this sense, after Turkey's accession to the EU, Azerbaijan will have large share of investments at the European market.

The Spirit of Convivencia

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If one had to come up with a symbolic date that marked the end of the twentieth century, it would most likely be November 9, 1989, the day when the demolition of the Berlin Wall began. Ironically, the same date marked the 51st anniversary of *Kristalnacht*, the night of broken glass, when shops, residences, and sites of religious prayer belonging to Jews were destroyed in Nazi Germany. While in November 9, 1938, sledge hammers were being used to destroy coexistence, 51 years later, on the same night, they were used for knocking down a wall that stood against freedom of movement. Today, the former is remembered in shame and sorrow while the latter symbolizes the joy of coexistence. Twentieth century has seen it all...

The downfall of the Berlin Wall garnered hopes in many people that the twenty first century would be a century of “no walls.” Today, in 2011, a new fence -if not a wall- along the Greek-Turkish border is in the making.

The downfall of the Berlin Wall garnered hopes in many people that the twenty first century would be a century of “no walls.” Another era of convivencia (coexistence) in Europe was in sight. Today, in 2011, a new fence -if not a wall- is in the making. This is a fence that will be built by the Greek authorities along the Greek-Turkish border that has been serving as a point of entry for illegal transit migration into the EU mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. At the beginning of 2011, Greece’s Minister of Citizen Protection, Christos Papoutsis announced his government’s intention to erect a fence along this border similar to the one that United States built along its Mexican border. French officials announced their blessing for the endeavor. This wall as well as all the other efforts that keep Turkey “outside” the EU contributes to the loss of the spirit of convivencia (el espíritu de convivencia) in Europe. Nevertheless, Turkey is practically inside the EU, with its 2.4 million citizens who are residents in major European cities¹,

¹ Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 94/2009, p. 4.

its official candidacy status since 1999, and the beginning of official negotiations – albeit with persistent blockages- since 2005. Derailment of relations between Turkey and EU does not only signal the loss of the spirit of *convivencia* in Europe but also in Turkey.

MOOR'S LAST SIGH

Convivencia is a term used to describe an era in medieval Spain. This era in al-Andalus lasted from the Muslim conquest of Hispania in 711 until 1492 when the Jews and Muslims were either forced to convert or expelled after the conquest of Granada by Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella. In her book titled *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*, Maria Rosa Menocal depicts an al-Andalus, a polyglot world that combined the best of Muslim, Jewish and Christian traditions creating a vibrant civilization which thrived in the face of enmity for about seven hundred years. It was ruled by the Moors, a term used to refer to Iberian Muslims (North African Arabs and Berbers). Two great intellectuals, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Musa Ibn Maymun (Maimonides), who shared a basic vision of human freedom, were born into this world that began to deteriorate during their lifetimes. More than a century later, Miguel de Cervantes still echoed the traits of those rich times of interaction in his 1605 novel *Don Quixote*.

A Europe that fences itself in is in contradiction with the original EU project.

In 1492, on the final ridge overlooking Granada, the last Muslim ruler of al-Andalus named Boabdil, turned back for a glance of his dominion before he surrendered the city to the Catholic monarchs and sighed in sorrow. That ridge came to be called the “Moor’s Last Sigh” (*El Ultimo Suspiro del Moro*) which is also the title of Salman Rushdie’s novel published in 1995. Today, we are fortunate that there are no such royal dominions in Europe. But, it seems like the European citizens lamenting the loss of the spirit of *convivencia* may soon be looking over the fence at the Greek-Turkish border and sigh in sorrow. The fence is likely to symbolize the last sigh of those Europeans who opt for a multicultural coexistence in Europe. A Europe that fences itself in is in contradiction with the original EU project.

LETHARGY IN EUROPE

From the very outset, EU was meant to be a union of values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities. In an insightful article written at the height of the debates for an EU Constitution, Kalypto Nicolaidis

maintained that “the glue that binds the EU together is not a shared identity; it is, rather, shared projects and objectives...The members’ sense of belonging and commitment to the union is based on what they accomplish together, not what they are together.”² These projects include the single market, the euro, enlargement, the promotion of peace, social justice, gender equality, children’s rights, sustainable development, a highly competitive social market economy, and full employment. Lately, the excitement over such projects has left its place to an understanding of Europe as a community of identity. European vocation began to be expressed in cultural terms. In May 2009, French President Nicholas Sarkozy declared: “Europe has to stop diluting itself in an enlargement without end...There are countries, like Turkey, which share with Europe a part of their common destiny but which do not have a European vocation.”³

Lately, at academic and policy-oriented conferences, cries of “wake up Europe!” have become quite common.

A leading academic and public intellectual, Timothy Garton Ash refers to five driving forces of the original European project: the memories of the Second World War, the Soviet threat to Western Europe and the desire of central and east European peoples to escape from Soviet domination, US support for European integration in response to such Soviet threat, efforts to rehabilitate a post-Nazi Germany, and the French ambition for a French-led Europe.⁴ He, then, declares that all of these driving forces have faded away. German response to the Greek financial crisis has put at stake the sustainability of the European values. French enthusiasm in the European project waned after the rejection of the EU Constitution. Europe fell into lethargy as well as a mounting concern with protecting privileges and resisting change. Lately, at academic and policy-oriented conferences, cries of “wake up Europe!” have become quite common.

VIGOR IN TURKISH POLITICS

At about the same time, Turkish politics was increasingly becoming more characterized by change both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. While the new Turkish industrialists called Anatolian Tigers began to shake the foundations of the old privileges of the Istanbul based businesses, foreign policy moves of the governing Justice and Development Party began to be characterized by words like “proactive,”

2 Kalypto Nicolaidis, “We, the Peoples of Europe . . .” *Foreign Affairs*, 83/6, November-December 2004, p. 103.

3 Nicholas Sarkozy, “European project of France,” presentation in Nimes, May 5, 2009.

4 Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe is sleepwalking to decline. We need a Churchill to wake it up,” *Guardian*, May 19, 2010.

“dynamic,” “multidimensional,” “constructive,” and “rhythmic diplomacy.” While the Greek government is planning to build a fence along the Greece-Turkish border, Western Balkan countries have already obtained visa free travel to Europe. Turkey, on the other hand, abolished visa requirements mutually with a number of countries such as Russia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Albania, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon and Iran.⁵ Ukraine may be next.

An aging and lethargic Europe that is keen on protecting privileges and resisting change constitutes a stark contrast with the young and dynamic Turkey that is tearing down old privileges and pressing for change.

An aging and lethargic Europe that is keen on protecting privileges and resisting change constitutes a stark contrast with the young and dynamic Turkey that is tearing down old privileges and pressing for change. Still, there have been significant moments when the government in Turkey fell behind its own reform agenda that opted for the harmonious coexistence of its citizens with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. To the dismay of liberal and democratic voices, the efforts in overturning the terms of the civil-military relations did not always proceed with ample pace. The legal investigations into the plots to overthrow the government have led to the detainment of various military officers. The fact that many journalists are also detained and the postponement of the disclosure of conclusive evidences against them has led to scars in the public conscience about these investigations. Moreover, a new law concerning the role of the Turkish Court of Accounts (*Sayıştay*) in auditing the expenses of the Turkish Armed Forces was accepted in the parliament in December 2010 with last minute reservations that limit the transparent nature of such inspections. Since Turkey’s official candidacy for membership in the EU in 1999, EU accession processes pushed for such reforms not only regarding the civil-military relations but also towards the utilization of the Kurdish language. The processes culminating in constitutional and other legal reforms have generated intense debates about the past and present composition of the *demos* (people) in Turkey. EU processes have triggered internal voices of opposition that seek equal rights and respect for difference. Maintaining the EU anchor can continue to strengthen these voices of democratization in Turkey.

5 For an insightful analysis of the impact of such abolishment of visa requirements on Turkey’s longstanding demands for free movement in Europe, see Nilgün Arısan Eralp, “Turkey’s Visa Policy: Has Turkey given up its demand of free movement in the EU?” TEPAV Evaluation Note, February 2010.

While Kurds and Alevis became increasingly more vocal in voicing multicultural rights, efforts on the part of the academics, public intellectuals and civil society organizations in coming to terms with the atrocities committed against non-Muslims during the demise of the Ottoman Empire as well as the Turkish Republic began to grow. Unfortunately, this did not prevent further violence against non-Muslims in Turkey. Moreover, political parties and actors representing Kurds in Turkey began to face major legal challenges almost every time they voiced their demands and/or spoke in Kurdish despite the legislative reforms that were passed –albeit inadequately- in the parliament. Turkey found itself in the paradoxical moment of realizing change with the lead of a conservative government.

REDISCOVERING CONVIVENCIA

EU-Turkey relations enhance the spirit of *convivencia* both in Europe and Turkey. The prospect of Turkish membership can not only rejuvenate an aging Europe but also prevent the rise of a European identity to the detriment of European values. Turkey in Europe enhances the original values of the EU. Turkey's move towards democratization, on the other hand, first and foremost necessitates an unreserved shift in the terms of civil-military relations.

While EU can illuminate Turkey's officially forgotten (and denied) past, Turkey can ignite the fire of a dynamic Europe embracing the spirit of convivencia once again. Let us not forget that Turkey is an official candidate; Convivencia is not, after all, such a quixotic vision.

The uplifting of multicultural rights in Turkey can not progress under the shadow of a military looming over politics. EU anchor can prevent the draw backs from the move towards civilian control of politics and set the standards for the protection of the rights of the minorities in Turkey. While EU can illuminate Turkey's officially forgotten (and denied) past, Turkey can ignite the fire of a dynamic Europe embracing the spirit of *convivencia* once again. Let us not forget that Turkey is an official candidate for membership in the EU. Therefore, *convivencia* is not, after all, such a quixotic vision. All it takes is political will in EU and Turkey to make it happen.



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