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CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 2012

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Two Communities, Two Different Versions of History

While the history of Cyprus dates back almost four thousand years as a center of human civilization, most Cypriots of today adhere to different versions of history depending on their ethnic background. The failure of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to reach a consensus regarding the history of their island is arguably the biggest component of what is commonly known as 'the Cyprus Problem'. Although the Ottoman era (1571-1878), as well as the British rule between 1878 and 1960 are also heavily disputed, the most controversial topic between Greek- and Turkish Cypriots is the historical chapter between 1963 and 1974. The British newspaper Guardian went even as far as stating that *'the Cyprus Problem was that no Turkish Cypriot could ever forget the period 1963-1974, and no Greek Cypriot could remember it.'*¹

While it is true that the notions of forgetting and remembering are individual psychological actions, the collective engagement of entire communities in such individual acts strongly suggest that certain traumatic events had shaped the collective consciousness of Greek Cypriots and that of Turkish Cypriots in quite different fashions. It is therefore essential to focus on the period of 1963-1974 in order to evaluate the events which led to the Turkish intervention and de-facto partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sections. It is during this eleven year period that numerous Turkish Cypriots were victims of Greek Cypriot EOKA terrorist organization, the ultimate goal of which was Enosis, i.e. the unification of Cyprus with Greece. While it is true that several prominent leftist Greek Cypriots who favored Cyprus' independence were also assassinated by the EOKA, the overwhelming majority of EOKA's victims were Turkish Cypriots.

¹ The Telegraph 'Rauf Denktash' 15 January 2012
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/9016548/Rauf-Denktash.html>

Although the 'Republic of Cyprus' which was founded in 1960 was based on proportional representation and equality between Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots, most historians concur that the newly founded independent state was a failed Western attempt to bring Turkish and Greek ethnic groups together. As many Turkish- and Greek Cypriots expected, this idealistic attempt was not viable, "*primarily because Greek Cypriot leaders, thinking wrongly that their community was an absolute majority on the island, were not prepared to recognize political equality of their Turkish Cypriot partners.*"² In the words of Andrew Mango, a prominent scholar of Ottoman and Turkish history, the tragedy of Turkish Cypriots began on Christmas Eve of 1963, when Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish Cypriot villages throughout all Cyprus, and forced Turkish Cypriots to retreat into small enclaves. Although Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü appealed to Britain to intervene as a guarantor state, the British government opted to refer the matter to the United Nations (UN) and call in the UN peacekeeping forces, the intervention of which temporarily stopped the slaughter of Turkish Cypriots civilians.³

While Turkish Cypriots' retreat into enclaves meant temporary protection from EOKA's violence, it also meant total isolation from their regular daily lives and prevention from participating in their economic activities. By the end of 1963, Nicosia, the capital of the Republic of Cyprus, was already divided into Turkish and Greek sections, separated by the Green Line. By the end of 1964, most Turkish Cypriots who had lived outside the capital were forced into small enclaves, protected by small garrisons of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, and isolated from their daily lives. In 1967, following the second terror campaign of EOKA against Turkish Cypriots, it was estimated that three-quarters of the island's Turkish community were living in enclaves, which constituted only three percent of the island's territory.⁴

The de-facto ethnic separation of Turkish- and Greek Cypriots in 1964, which continues until today has arguably its roots in most Greek Cypriots' refusal to treat Turkish Cypriots as equal citizens. Even expert scholars on Cyprus with an admitted pro-Greek

² Ahmad, Ishtiaq (2000). 'Prospect of Cyprus Settlement after the Helsinki Summit' in *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol.8. Istanbul:Erler. pp. 61-62

³ Mango, Andrew (2004). *The Turks Today*. London: Murray. p.

⁴ Official Website of BBC. *Timeline: Cyprus* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1021835.stm>

bias acknowledge that a sizeable portion of Greek Cypriots do not consider Turkish Cypriots as their equals and compatriots. James Pettifer, who is among prominent scholars regarding Turkish-Greek relations and otherwise an adamant supporter of predominantly Greek causes, admits that the majority of Greek Cypriot people as well as politicians do not prefer to coexist with Turkish Cypriots in form of a federation or confederation. According to Pettifer, most Greek Cypriots political leaders do not want to share the recently accumulated wealth with Turkish Cypriots, and tacitly support the status quo. Pettifer also points out that the Greek Cypriot population still admire Nikos Sampson, the leader of the military coup against Archbishop Makarios in 1974, and that they *'would happily see the Turks and Turkish settlers driven into the sea, or evacuated on ships back to Izmir, now a major port for the Turkish navy but once Greek Smyrna'*.⁵

Given this innate notions of moral, economic and demographic superiority, it can safely be argued that most Greek Cypriots have never been willing grant Turkish Cypriots political, as well as cultural equality. Since it has become impossible, at least in military terms, to impose restricted minority rights on Turkish Cypriots since 1974, the tacit support for the status quo among certain Greek Cypriots become more understandable. It goes also without saying that the ethnic separation of Turkish- and Greek Cypriot communities began at least a decade before the intervention of Turkey in 1974. In the light of these historical facts, it can safely be argued that the Greek Cypriot official argument regarding the peaceful coexistence and harmonious cohabitation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots before the Turkish intervention in 1974 does not reflect the truth.

The Myth about Turkish Attempts to Change the Ethnic Composition of Cyprus

Another strongly disputed issue which is related to the dubious Greek Cypriot claim about Greek- and Turkish Cypriot peaceful cohabitation prior to 1974 is the settlement of mainland Turks in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey's alleged attempts to change the ethnic composition of Cyprus. According to the claims of Greek Cypriot Administration, Turkey aims at changing the demographic character and to

⁵ Pettifer, James (1993). *The Greeks. The Land and People Since the War*. London: Penguin. pp. 200-201

distort the population balance between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus, in order to justify the claims of the Turkish side regarding the territorial and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus Problem. The Greek Cypriot officials insist that Turkish Cypriots never constituted more than 18 percent of Cyprus' total population, and Turkish Cypriot entitlement to political and economic rights should not exceed this particular ratio in future negotiations.⁶

While it is true that the mass immigration of mainland Turks to the TRNC raise certain concerns about personal safety and erosion of Turkish Cypriot culture, Turkish Cypriots generally welcome well-mannered and educated mainland Turks who did not oppose integrating into Turkish Cypriot society. Most Turkish Cypriots also point out that they oppose only those mainland Turks who come to TRNC with purpose of involving in illegal activities or welfare abuse. In contrast to the related Greek Cypriot claims that TRNC does not possess sovereign rights, Turkish Cypriot authorities deport a significant number of Turkish nationals who break the laws of TRNC.⁷ Moreover, TRNC citizenship is, in most cases, granted only to those Turkish nationals who had been living in TRNC for more than 5 years with a proven record of legal and gainful economic activity. Although there have been numerous cases where TRNC citizenship was granted to legally undeserving Turkish nationals in exchange for political or economic favors, this wrongful practice is proven to be an exception rather than the rule.

Regarding the Greek Cypriot claims about Turkish distortion of ethnic composition and Turkish Cypriot/Greek Cypriot rate of Cyprus, on the other hand, numerous academic studies prove that Turkish Cypriots have generally been constituting much more than only 18 percent of the island's population. While it is still disputable whether Turkish Cypriots have ever constituted a majority in Cyprus since the Ottoman conquest in 1571, it is an undisputed fact that Turkish Cypriots' population ratio fluctuated between 30 and 40 percent during the British rule in Cyprus (1878-1960). The upsurge of Greek Cypriot nationalism in early 1950s and its violent campaign for Enosis (Union with Greece) was not directed only against the British rule, but also against Turkish Cypriots

⁶ Official Website of Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus' Foreign Ministry
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus06_en/cyprus06_en?OpenDocument

⁷ Alibaba, Arzu. 'KKTC'de Yabancıların Sınır Dışı Edilmesi' *İstanbul Üniversitesi Milletlerarası Hukuk Bülteni*. Sayı 27 <http://www.iudergi.com/tr/index.php/hukukmhb/article/viewFile/2457/2050>

who were accused of being British collaborators. The EOKA-B propaganda and deteriorating economic conditions forced about 30 thousand Turkish Cypriots to emigrate between 1955 and 1974.⁸

A significant part of the Turkish Cypriot population, who had escaped EOKA violence in Cyprus and immigrated to Turkey, United Kingdom, and Australia, returned to the TRNC after the Turkish intervention in 1974. Since the majority of these Turkish Cypriots had already obtained Turkish or British, or Australian citizenship by the time of their return, it became difficult to determine the exact number of Turkish Cypriots among other nationalities. The problem of determining whether a returning Turkish Cypriot is rather 'Cypriot', 'British', or 'Turkish' becomes apparent especially in the case of the United Kingdom, which has been the primary destination of Turkish Cypriot immigrants. According to a study conducted by the British Government in 2009, there are 130.000 Turkish Cypriots in the United Kingdom, 18.000 of which were Cyprus-born. The study further states that there are several thousand Turkish Cypriots who arrived in the UK with a Turkish passport, and thus classified as a Turkish, rather than Turkish Cypriot.⁹

As it is the case with Turkish Cypriots in the UK, it is also impossible to determine the exact number of Turkish Cypriots with Turkish citizenship who returned to the TRNC after the Turkish intervention in 1974. Nevertheless, academic studies demonstrate that Turkish Cypriots made up a significant portion of about 100.000 Turkish nationals who settled in TRCN since 1974. Given that Greek Cypriot authorities destroyed birth records of several thousands of Turkish Cypriots in the period between 1963 and 1974, many returning Turkish nationals permanently lost their opportunity to prove their Turkish Cypriot ancestry.¹⁰ Ironically, these Turkish Cypriots with solely Turkish citizenship, who were deprived of their birth records by Greek Cypriot authorities, are currently classified by the same authorities as 'mainland Turkish settlers' and 'Turkish colonizers'. It goes therefore without saying that Greek Cypriot claim that Turkish Cypriots historically constitute only 18 percent of Cyprus' population does not reflect the ethnic and demographic realities of the island.

⁸ Brewin, Christopher (2000). *The European Union and Cyprus*. Cambridge: Eothen Press, pp. 46-47

⁹ Official Website of the UK Department for Communities and Local Government. *The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Muslim Community in England*. April 2009.

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1203710.pdf>

¹⁰ Bertrand, G., 'Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s) committed to peace?', *Turkish Studies*,5:2, 93-110

GASC's EU Membership Despite Greek Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004

The current controversy regarding the Greek Cypriot Presidency of the EU which is scheduled to begin on 1 July 2012 can, in many aspects, be compared with the controversy regarding the EU accession of the Greek Administration of South Cyprus (GASC) in 2004. As it was the case in 2004 with GASC's accession to the EU, many academicians and statesmen became very concerned about the Greek Cypriot Presidency, and its potentially devastating effects on EU-Turkish relations. While the legitimacy of Greek Cypriot Presidency is a highly controversial issue, this ambiguity is only part of the bigger dilemma regarding the legal validity of 'Republic of Cyprus' EU membership despite its refusal of the Annan Plan in 2004 and its ongoing isolationist policies towards Turkish Cypriots.

Shortly before the referendum on the Annan Plan on 24 April 2004, the GASC President Tassos Papadopoulos, as well as the majority of Greek Cypriot political leaders, were strongly opposed to the Annan plan, and simultaneously (and paradoxically) adamant in their opinion that Turkey was entirely responsible for Cyprus' failure to reunify. With the tacit support of GASC authorities, those Greek Cypriots who supported the Annan plan were intimidated despite heavy protests from United Nations and the European Union. While GASC President Tassos Papadopoulos publicly condemned the plan, the Bishop of Nicosia threatened Greek Cypriots who supported the Annan plan with eternal damnation.¹¹ Mainly due to the state-backed negative propaganda and intimidation campaigns, all major political parties in the GASC, with the exception Glafcos Clerides' Democratic Coalition Party (DISI), publicly declared their opposition the Annan Plan.

When an overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan on 24 April 2004, the initial reaction of the European Union was disappointment and anger at Greek Cypriot Administrations' attitude. Günter Verheugen, the Enlargement Commissioner who had helped Cyprus into the EU, declared that he felt disappointed and cheated by the Greek-Cypriot government. Chris Patten, European Commission's External Affairs Commissioner, accused the Greek Cypriots of betrayal and stated that the Greek Cypriots

¹¹ Dubin, Mark (2009). *The Rough Guide to Cyprus*, London: Penguin. p. 406

were not going to be a popular addition to the EU family.¹² To the chagrin of Turkey and TRNC, however, European Union's sympathy towards Turkish Cypriots, which found their expression in the statements of Chris Patten and Günter Verheugen, vanished within few months following the Greek Cypriot accession to the EU on 1 May 2004.

At the Brussels Summit on 16-17 December 2004, the European Union set 3 October 2005 as the starting date of Turkey's accession negotiations, but officially linked eventual Turkish membership to the Union's 'absorption capacity', a concept which could neither be measured nor evaluated. On 29 July 2005, Turkey and the EU signed the Additional Protocol which extended the Ankara Agreement to new member states that acceded to the EU in 2004. While signing the Additional Protocol, Turkey also annexed an official declaration which explicitly stated that Turkey, by signing the Additional Protocol, did not recognize the "Republic of Cyprus" by any means.¹³ The European Council, in response to the Turkey's refusal to recognize 'the Republic of Cyprus', blocked eight negotiation chapters with Turkey in 2006, and thus officially broke the Union's promise that Greek Cypriot accession to the EU would not, under any circumstances, stall Turkey's EU membership.

Despite the EU's failure, or unwillingness, to keep its promises to Turkey, as well as its initial criticism of the GASC for refusing the Annan Plan, the overall blame for Turkey-GASC conflict was shifted to Turkey. According to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Turkey's refusal to establish diplomatic relations with 'the Republic of Cyprus', (the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Treaty, EU Declaration of 21 September 2005), is paradoxical given that Turkey wishes to join an organization one member of which it does not recognize.¹⁴ In other words, Greek diplomats point out that Turkey accepted the start of EU negotiations on 3 October 2005, more than one year after the EU had admitted GASC as a full member despite heavy Turkish opposition. According to the reasoning of Greek Foreign Ministry, Turkey should have refused starting accession negotiations with the EU, especially if it felt so wronged about the accession of GASC into the EU.

¹² Black, Ian & Helena Smith (2004). 'EU to reward Turkish Cypriots'. *The Guardian*. 26 April 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/26/cyprus.helenasmith?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487>

¹³ Official Website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, *Turkey-EU Relations*.
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

¹⁴ Official Website of Greek Foreign Ministry . *The Cyprus Issue*.
<http://www.mfa.gr/en/the-cyprus-issue/>

Intercommunal Peace Talks since the Greek Cypriot EU Membership in 2004

Following the Greek Cypriot EU Membership in 2004, the Turkish- and Turkish Cypriot were further convinced that the Greek Cypriots no longer have any incentive to reach a solution regarding the unification of Cyprus. Despite the prevailing Turkish Cypriot pessimism due to the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan and eventual EU Membership, the Prime Minister of TRNC, Mehmet Ali Talat, who was elected to the TRNC Presidency in on 17 May 2005, brought new impetus and enthusiasm to intercommunal talks. While Talat's first three years coincided with the GASC Presidency of Tassos Papadopoulos, the mastermind who orchestrated the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan, Cyprus' future seemed more optimistic when Demetris Christofias, leader of the communist AKEL party, became the GASC President on 28 February 2008. Since Demetris Christofias declaredly belonged to a political and ideological movement that prioritized rapprochement and cooperation between Greek- and Turkish Cypriots, expectations regarding a permanent solution rose on both parts of Cyprus.

Few months after the inauguration of the new GASC President, on 1 July 2008, Talat and Christofias *'agreed to reach a solution that would be bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, for a state with a single sovereignty, a single citizenship, and a single international personality.*

¹⁵ On the base of the initial agreement between Mehmet Ali Talat and Demetris Christofias, Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot leaders met 141 times under the auspices of United Nations Good Offices Mission in Cyprus. The last 70 of these 141 meetings took place between Demetris Christofias and Derviş Eroğlu, who was elected to the TRNC Presidency on 23 April 2010. As agreed by the Turkish- and Greek Cypriot sides, as well as by the United Nations, the meetings and negotiations were *being conducted under the overriding principle of the "integrated whole approach" which means that "nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed."*¹⁶ The ambitious nature of this 'integrated whole

¹⁵ 'Interview with Demetris Christofias', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 01/2012
<http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/2012-1-DemetrisChristofiasInterview.pdf>

¹⁶ Official Website of the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Cyprus
http://www.uncyprustalks.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2921

approach' however, rather played into the hands of the Greek Cypriot negotiators who focused on minor disagreements despite Turkish Cypriot concessions on major issues.

As GASC President Christofias also admitted, the new TRNC President Derviş Eroğlu committed himself to continue negotiations from the point Christofias left off with the previous TRNC President Talat, but refused to adhere to the convergences in case Greek Cypriot reversal on previously agreed issues. Given that Derviş Eroğlu, belonging to the political movement of Rauf Denktaş, the founder and first president of the TRNC, had a tougher stance on sovereignty issue, the Greek Cypriot leadership could effectively blame Eroğlu with intransigence. The Greek Cypriot decision to start exploratory oil and natural gas drilling without consulting Turkish Cypriot authorities on 18 September 2012 further deteriorated the prospects of bi-communal talks. The negative outlook regarding the Cyprus question became also evident in the latest 'Assessment report of the Secretary-General on the status of the negotiations in Cyprus', dated 12 March 2012, in which Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that*"the political environment in which the negotiations are currently taking place has become increasingly difficult."*¹⁷

It goes without saying, then, that the veracity of Greek Cypriot claim that the failure to reunite Cyprus until this day has been solely due to the intransigence of Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership, is highly questionable. Especially since accession of GASC to the EU, Greek Cypriot leaders have been involving the Union in the bi-communal talks whenever they need to refrain from rejecting a Turkish Cypriot compromise. By doing so, Greek Cypriot negotiators often avoid being seen as the intransigent side, and point a finger at Turkish Cypriot leaders whenever they reject a Greek Cypriot proposal. Moreover, due to the fact that Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to be represented in EU institutions, they are also deprived of the chance to challenge and disprove the veracity of Greek Cypriot claims. By turning a deaf ear to Turkish Cypriot arguments, however, the EU sentences itself to the narrowest and totally misleading version of the Cyprus conflict, which is namely the official doctrine of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

¹⁷ Official Page of United Nations Good Offices Mission in Cyprus. 'Assessment report of the Secretary-General on the status of the negotiations in Cyprus'
http://www.uncyprustalks.org/media/SG%20Reports/SG_Report_Good_Offices_12March2012.pdf

Can Cyprus Learn from the recent Turkish-Greek Rapprochement? Prospects for a Solution

Despite the prevailing attitude of self righteousness, it can be argued that certain segments of Greek Cypriot society recently started to make goodwill gestures towards the Turkish Cypriots, which were quite unimaginable prior to the Greek Cypriot EU membership in 2004. Although Greek Cypriot Administration's international campaign against TRNC's recognition continues relentlessly, several Greek Cypriot statesmen and opinion leaders admit past errors, and express their condemnation of EOKA-B's terroristic activities. Demetris Christofias, President of GASC and leader of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL), apologized for the actions of EOKA-B against Turkish Cypriots, and for Cypriot state's failure to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. Glafkos Clerides, a prominent Greek Cypriot statesman and former President of GASC, sincerely admitted in 2006 that Enosis would remain as an ideal, however an unrealistic one, and that no Greek Cypriot would dare to publicly oppose Enosis.¹⁸ While the emotional attachment of Greek Cypriots to the Enosis idea has been the biggest stumbling block in front of Turkish- and Greek Cypriot dialog, the recent increase in Greek Cypriot willingness to admit past mistakes may be interpreted as a modest hope for optimism.

As early as in 1993, British historian James Pettifer had predicted that all conflicts between Turkey and Greece, as well as those between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, could be solved once Greek leaders would abandon their claims of moral superiority over Turkey simply because Greece shares the same religion with civilized Europe. In his authoritative book about Greece, Pettifer predicted that Greece *'may make possible better relations with Turkey, in that for so long this dispute has been symbolized at a certain level of the Greek political mentality as a contest between the civilized Christian West, represented by Greece, and the authoritarian, anti-democratic Turkish East with its Moslem religion and unhealthy political traditions...'*¹⁹

¹⁸ Kızılyürek, Niyazi (2007). *Glafkos Klerides. Tarihten Güncelliğe Bir Kıbrıs Yolculuğu*. İstanbul:İletişim. p.133

¹⁹ Pettifer, James (1993). *The Greeks. The Land and People Since the War*. London: Penguin. p. 43

Arguably, the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece was partly owed to the fact that Greece gave up its claim of historical moral superiority over Turkey which had gained wide ranged acceptance throughout Europe. In other words, Greek statesmen showed political maturity and goodwill by not resorting to Europe's historical prejudices about Turkey as much as they had done prior to 1999. By refraining from requesting EU's assistance and intervention on Greek behalf, Greece managed to tackle its problems with Turkey bilaterally, and thus convinced their Turkish counterparts that Turkey does not have to deal with prejudiced third parties, i.e. the European Union, which has been adamantly indoctrinated with pro-Greek opinion since Greece's EU accession in 1981. Despite having managed to turn its own arguments into EU arguments following its EU membership, Greece, in most instances, prevented the EU from intervening in Turkish-Greek disputes on Greece's behalf. Greek refusal to involve the European Union in Turkish-Greek disputes, in turn, strengthened the dialog and empathy between Greece and Turkey, which resulted in significant improvements in Greek-Turkish relationship between 1999 until present.

The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, on the other hand, has so far proved to be enthusiastic to employ its EU membership in its relations with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The fact that the European Union allowed the GASC to become a member of the Union despite having rejected the Annan Plan provides Greek Cypriot leaders with unprecedented and unconditional EU support when dealing with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. Since the Greek Cypriot accession to the European Union in 2004 is unmistakably a bigger EU concession as compared to the assumption of European Council Presidency in 2012, the Greek Cypriot leadership has a well-deserved right to assume that it has been given a carte blanche when dealing with its Turkish Cypriot counterparts. Turkey, however, so far refused, or failed, to give up its expectation that the European Union's would intervene on Turkish Cypriots' behalf, if only in cases of extreme and undisputed Greek Cypriot intransigence. Mainly due to this unrealistic expectation, however, Turkey is destined to be continuously disappointed in its relations with the Union, simply because the EU does not consider it worth to amend its past mistakes regarding Cyprus.

While addressing the GASC Parliament on 28 May 2012, President of the EU Council Herman van Rompuy stated that “*overcoming the situation was difficult in 1974, it was difficult in 2000..., but if nothing changes it will still be difficult in 2025... Nobody should be a prisoner of the past. [Cypriots] can choose a different future.*” President van Rompuy also added that ‘*Cyprus can count on [his own] support and on that of the European Union in the efforts to reach a settlement.*’²⁰ While van Rompuy’s declaration of support regarding Cyprus issue and his optimism about the future is noteworthy, it is also necessary to remind him that no Turkish Cypriots representatives have been allowed in the alleged ‘Parliament of Cyprus’ since 1963, eleven years before the Turkish intervention. For the last 49 years, all EU statesmen, including Herman van Rompuy, have been addressing an assembly which calls itself ‘the Parliament of Cyprus’, despite being composed of solely Greek Cypriot deputies. The President of the EU Council should therefore consider the inconsistency of his opinion with regard to his own participation in Turkish Cypriots’ isolation by addressing the Parliament of GASC and disregarding the Parliament of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during his visit to the divided island.

²⁰ Official Website of the Council of the EU. *Speech by the President of the European Council to the Parliament of Cyprus.* http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/130461.pdf